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FAMILY CLASSES: RETHINKING
CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE
Naomi Cahn & June Carbone*
I suggest that, apart from the muted story of racism, implications of
social class have been neglected in the legal literature on abortion and
divorce . . . . In essence, we witness in the United States a raging battle
within limited segments of the middle classes on how to regulate the
consequences of sexual conduct of everybody else. The American lower
classes and large parts of the lower-middle class have no voice or no
opinion, and the upper class is unconcerned.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Each of us teaches family law, which provides an opportunity to
reflect on the differing meanings of families and class. A rich,
controversial, and storied literature addresses the intersections of race,
gender, class, and family.2 Anthropology once also devoted
considerable attention to working-class life, including differences in
family formation. Over the last fifty years, however, explicit attention to
family and class has only sporadically appeared in legal and policy
discourse. Initially it was overshadowed by discussions of race and
family, especially in the wake of the controversial Moynihan Report of
the sixties, and the effective disappearance of marriage in poor AfricanAmerican communities.3 In the eighties and nineties, it briefly
resurfaced as part of the discussion of welfare reform, and Charles
Murray‟s efforts to sound the alarm about “The Coming White
* Naomi Cahn, John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School. June Carbone, the Edward A. Smith/Missouri Chair of Law,
Constitution and Society, UMKC School of Law. This Article is based on Naomi Cahn‟s
Weyrauch Distinguished Lecture, delivered March 23, 2009, at the University of Florida, Levin
College of Law, and Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal
Polarization and the Creation of Culture (2010). Our thanks to Nancy Dowd, Shani King, Nancy
Levit, and Barbara Woodhouse.
1. Walter O. Weyrauch, Family Law Book Review, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 832, 836 (1989)
(reviewing MARY A. GLENDON, HERMENEUTICS, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, A REVIEW OF
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)).
2. A comprehensive list would be vast. On race, see, for example, ORLANDO
PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN CENTURIES
(1999); on class, see JOAN WILLIAMS, CLASS ACTS AND GENDER WORKS: RESHAPING THE
EVERYDAY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS OF WORK AND FAMILY (forthcoming 2010).
3. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 2.
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Underclass.”4 More recently, however, the moral values discussion and
its role in the ideological divisions between the left and right have
overshadowed the importance of class in explaining changes in family
dynamics.
The political attention paid to moral values—in the context of the
high profile fights over abortion, homosexuality, and abstinence
education—has developed over the past quarter century in ideological
terms as though race and class no longer existed. In fact, the changing
understandings that attend family formation reflect a long term shift in
the pathways to middle class life creating a new technocratic elite—an
elite that invests heavily in both men and women‟s advanced degrees,
and has remade family life to its advantage. The success of the new
model, which we call the “blue family paradigm,” and the sexual
revolution at its core undermines what had once been consensus support
for traditional values (which we will call “the red family paradigm”),
and for the structure of family life following from abstinence to
courtship to marriage.5
The result of the tensions between these family ideals has been a
moral backlash. To be sure, the leaders of the political backlash
represent a different elite—one dominated by the more conservative,
more business-oriented and more religious Republicans in the South and
Midwest. As political scientist Andrew Gelman emphasizes in Red
State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State, political differences are greater
among people with higher incomes, and religious attendance better
predicts political differences of the rich than of the poor.6 If we consider
only high income elites, then the divide on social issues between the
well-educated, secular elites who dominate Democratic areas of the
country, and the more religious, high income voters who dominate
Republican areas of the country is more pronounced than the political
differences between poorer voters on the issues underlying the culture
wars.7
While these political leaders and activists frame the issues (and do so
without much reference to race and class), the dispute nonetheless
reflects three significant class dimensions, which we will highlight in
this Article. First, the communities “on the cusp” of this family
transformation are what in another era we might have recognized as the
4. Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14;
see generally CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980
(1984).
5. We set out these paradigms more fully in RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES (2010).
6. ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY
AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY DO 92-93 (2008).
7. Id.
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white working class. This group, which has income levels well above
the poverty line, but lower levels of education than the more
comfortable middle class, sees the foundation of its marriage-based
family life under assault. Divorce rates for these communities have
plateaued near their historic highs, and nonmarital birth rates have
grown, particularly for the 20-24 year-old age group ready to begin
family life. Social conservatives are genuinely concerned about what
they see as the moral decay of their communities, and resent the
celebration of more open and tolerant attitudes toward sexuality that
undermine (and sometimes denigrate) their efforts to instill age old
values in their children.
The second overlooked class dimension in these struggles, however,
is the opposite of the first. Efforts to stem the “moral decay” in these
more traditional communities, which often have taken the form of high
profile efforts to promote abstinence in public schools and to harass and
obstruct abortion clinics, may make family-based inequality even worse
for poorer families. In the poorest communities, marriage has already
disappeared for all intents and purposes, and moral suasion alone cannot
bring it back. “Moral responses,” such as abstinence-only education and
lesser access to contraception and abortion, disproportionately affect
those without the resources to circumvent the new strictures and
produce more unwanted births in the process—exacerbating growing
inequality, which determines the circumstances of the next generation.
The third dimension is the change in the distribution of overall
fertility. Many American commentators celebrate the fact that overall
U.S. fertility remains above the replacement rate and well ahead of
fertility in Europe and Japan. The high overall rates, however, which
most pundits acknowledge reflect Latino immigration to the United
States, also occur because of much higher rates of unintended
pregnancy than in most of the rest of the developed world. If we were to
acknowledge the unintended pregnancy rate, we might also have to
acknowledge that the “blue” regions of the country in fact have fertility
levels that approach those of Northern Europe, and that an uncritical
embrace of delayed childbearing would produce much higher rates of
involuntary childlessness.
In this Article, we highlight the tensions between the two family
models, describe the backlash these tensions have produced, and
critique the class-based nature of the results. We argue that the
politicization of family issues has produced its own “vicious cycle” of
moral concern, draconian changes that disproportionately affect the
poorest and most vulnerable Americans, and a new round of moral
panic justifying further punitive measures, as the initial restrictions
(such as closing abortion clinics and slashing family planning funds)
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make matters worse. We conclude that the “culture wars” are very much
about class, and yet they are framed exactly as Professor Weyrauch
reported: a fight between two relatively privileged groups, in which
class implications of the struggle disappear from sight. This Article
argues that only by making these class implications visible—for low
income, middle class, and wealthy individuals—can we design more
effective interventions that can break the cycle.
II. FAMILY FORMATION IN BLUE AND RED
Family has become a marker of class in American life, exacerbating
economic inequality. The children of well-educated parents
overwhelmingly grow up in two-parent, two-income families with
substantially greater material and emotional resources than those
available to the single-parent families that have come to dominate
poorer communities.8 Within working-class families, the level of
education necessary to achieve middle class status is becoming
increasingly difficult to obtain, exacerbated by economic difficulties
made worse by family instability. As Harvard economists Claudia
Goldin and Lawrence Katz point out,
recent wage structure changes have been associated with a
“polarization” of the U.S. labor market with employment
shifting into high-and low-wage jobs at the expense of
middle-wage positions. . . . [T]he majority of the increase
in wage inequality since 1980 has come from rising
educational wage differentials, particularly rising returns to
post-secondary schooling.”9
The role of family structure in aggravating economic inequality
starts with two overlapping changes in the American economy. First,
the returns to higher education, and especially post-graduate degrees,
are greater than ever, and those rewards are now available to both men
and women. Second, greater global economic competition has driven
the high paid manufacturing jobs available to less educated men
8. Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Fare Under the Second
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608, 614-15 (2004).
9. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES IN THE U.S, WAGE
STRUCTURE:
NARROWING,
WIDENING,
POLARIZING
2
(2007),
http://www3.
brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/forum/200709goldin_katz.pdf [hereinafter
GOLDIN & KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES].
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overseas. As Goldin and Katz observe, the middle in the American
market has diminished, leaving relatively low-paying service jobs where
pay has stagnated, but increasing the demand for highly educated and
skilled workers.10
The middle class responded to these changes by investing more in
their children, and doing so for both men and women. During the
sixties, overall college attendance grew. From 1960 to 1970, the rise in
the number of college students “was nothing short of phenomenal,” with
enrollment more than doubling from 3.8 million to 8.5 million, an
increase of over 100%, and increasing by another 41% in the
seventies.11 Women‟s attendance grew faster than men‟s, rising from
1.3 million in 1960 to more than 3 million in 1970.12 By 1980, women
constituted more than half of all undergraduates.13 In 2003, 30.9% of
the women aged 25 to 29 in the United States were college graduates
compared to 26% of men.14
The rise in women‟s educational attainment and career ambitions
would have been difficult to reconcile with the family formation
patterns of the fifties, where the average age of marriage for the country
as a whole dropped to twenty, fueled in part by an increase in the
number of brides pregnant at the altar. Over the course of the next two
decades, as the number of women attending college grew, the “sexual
revolution” took hold, transforming the lives of women in their
twenties, and changing middle class understandings about the
foundation of family life.
In this period, not only did the percentage of college graduates
married by age twenty-three drop by 40%, but those married by age 26
fell from more than 70% of those born in the mid-forties (the college
graduates of the late sixties) to approximately half of those born in
1960.15 The increase in the ranks of unmarried young adults occurred
simultaneously with an increase in the sexual activity of younger
women, a dramatic drop in teen births, and changing expectations about
fertility. Economists Goldin and Katz observe that, using a variety of
data samples from the era, the percentage of women who report
10. See id. at 8, 11; see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill:
Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 749
[hereinafter Goldin & Katz, The Power of the Pill].
11. Russell W. Rumberger, The Job Market for College Graduates, 1960-1990, 55 J.
HIGHER EDUC. 433, 436 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1981442.pdf.
12. Id. at 437 tbl.1.
13. Id.
14. NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2003, at 4 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-550.pdf.
15. GOLDIN & KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES, supra note 9; Goldin & Katz, The Power of
the Pill, supra note 10, at 751.
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engaging in sex before the age of twenty-one grew from about 40% of
those born in 1945 to more than 70% of those born a decade later.16 The
number reporting sexual activity before the age of eighteen grew even
more dramatically, from about 15% of those born in 1945 to more than
40% of those born in 1955.17 In the sixties, half of the women who
engaged in premarital sex did so only with their fiancés, yet by the mideighties, less than 25% of the women who reported having pre-marital
sex did so only with men they expected to marry.18
Nonetheless, despite the increase in sexual activity, birth rates
dropped. Whereas the teen birthrate crested in 1957 at 97 births per
thousand girls between the ages of 15 and 19, by 1983 the rates fell
almost in half to 52 births per thousand girls.19 Adoption rates between
unrelated individuals also changed markedly. They peaked at all time
highs in 1970, but dropped in half by 1975.20 During this same period,
expectations about fertility changed. In 1963, 80% of non-Catholic
female college students wanted three or more children, and 44% wanted
at least four.21 By 1973, just 29% wanted three or more children (and
the cohort had fewer children than even those lower numbers)—an
extraordinary shift in a ten-year period.22
These changes in the relationship between sex, marriage, and the
transition to adulthood created what we have termed the “blue family
paradigm.” With this new set of family values, emotional maturity and
financial independence are the sine qua non of responsible family
formation. In order to facilitate the investment in workforce potential of
both men and women, it is critical to postpone family formation until
education is complete and careers are established. Women‟s greater
financial contributions to family income, in turn, require greater male
socialization into more egalitarian and companionate relationships.
Because marriage and childbearing are postponed until individuals are
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 753.
KRISTIN LUKER , ABORTION & THE P OLITICS OF M OTHERHOOD 87-95 (1984).
STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 202-03 (1992); see also LUKER, supra note 18, at 196 tbl.1 (showing that
teenage birthrates were 79.5 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1950, 91.0 births per
thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1960, 73.3 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1965,
69.7 births per thousand women aged 15 to 19 in 1970, and 59.9 births per thousand women
aged 15 to 19 in 1990).
20. Penelope L. Maza, Adoption Trends: 1944-1975, in CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH
NOTES #9, at 1-4 (U.S. Children‟s Bureau 1984), available at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/
~adoption/archive/MazaAT.htmChildWelfareResearchNotes#9. Washington, DC: Administration for Children, Youth, and Families (1984).
21. Goldin & Katz, The Power of the Pill, supra note 10, at 752.
22. Id.
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in their late twenties and early thirties, fertility control is critical:
abstinence is unrealistic because of the long gap between puberty and
marriage, contraception is not only permissible, but morally compelled,
and abortion is the responsible fallback.
Those who have followed the new blue paradigm have profited
handsomely. With later marriage there is less guesswork involved in
picking a mate. We have a much better sense by the age of thirty than at
twenty regarding who will be successful and who will not, who will
outgrow teen partying and who will be an alcoholic, who will pursue
career ambitions and who will give up, and who will acknowledge their
attraction to same-sex partners. Goldin and Katz report that assortative
mating has increased the effect—the well-educated marry the welleducated, and benefit from two higher incomes.23 Moreover, while the
educated hold more liberal attitudes generally, and while the “blue”
areas of the country demonstrate more tolerance toward sexuality and a
variety of family forms, the well-educated have remade the terms of
family life to better support two-parent, married families than the rest of
the population.24
Thus, sociologist Sara McLanahan, drawing on studies by Steve
Martin, emphasizes that the best-off quarter of America, defined by
women‟s level of education, has increased the advantages for its
children along every measurable outcome.25 For this group of families,
divorce rates have fallen back to the level of the early sixties—before
no-fault divorce, nonmarital birth rates are 7%, the same as in the midsixties, fathers spend more time with their children while mothers spend
no less (the women cut back on housework instead), and family income
has increased appreciably while stagnating for everyone else.26
The explanation McLanahan offers for these developments is the
change in the age of marriage: for the best-educated quartile of
American women, mothers‟ median age rose from 26 in 1970 to 32 in
2000.27 For mothers in the bottom quartile, it remained relatively flat at
22.28 For the middle group, it rose slightly from 24 to 26. The age of
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. McLanahan, supra note 8, at 608.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 609.
28. Id. It should be noted, however, that fertility rates have also dropped, especially for
teens. See Child Trends Data Bank, Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women,
www.childtrendsdatabank.org/pdf/75_PDF.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). Between 1960 and
2000, for example, births to 15 to 19 year old women fell by more than half. Id. The
composition of the remaining births nonetheless varies by race and class. Id. White women, for
example, have higher birth rates in every age group above twenty-five, while African Americans
have higher birth rates in every cohort under twenty-five, even though both races report
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childbearing is thus a marker of class, and for those who avoid early
child-bearing, conventional families with two married parents and a
high degree of stability follow to a remarkable degree with a minimum
of external coercion.29
This result has undermined the traditional routes to family life in two
overlapping ways. First, for the poorest Americans, it has made
marriage that much harder to come by, producing dramatically greater
rates of nonmarital births.30 A lengthy literature debates the reason for
the shift, but perhaps the most intriguing explanation involves
bargaining theory and the decline of the “shot gun” marriage.
Economists Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz observe that for traditionalists
“courtship” used to involve an implied promise: if the woman got
pregnant, the man married her.31 As women gained the ability to control
their own fertility through use of the pill and access to abortion, the
implied promise disappeared.32 For women who used family planning to
avoid childbirth and for those women who did not want or were not
ready for children (and, indeed, for those women who wanted sex on the
same terms as men), these developments increased their range of
choices.33 Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz emphasize, however, that the
women most disadvantaged by these developments were those ready to
start childbearing and unable to secure a promise to marry.34 The groups
for whom this may have been most important are the white working
class, where courtship was typically sexual, brief, and concentrated in
the late teens, and poorer women ready to begin childbearing at younger
ages more generally.
Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz conclude that the advent of the birth
control pill and abortion produced dramatic declines in the overall
number of unintended births, but also produced a higher percentage of
nonmarital births—and did so disproportionately for poorer women.35
Today, 72% of African-American births are nonmarital, and the shot
gun marriage, which was never as strong a tradition among Africansubstantial declines in teen childbearing. Id.
29. For a summary of the benefits of later marriage and childbearing, see ELIZABETH
GREGORY, READY: WHY WOMEN ARE EMBRACING THE NEW LATER MOTHERHOOD 8-10 (2007)
(noting that women who give birth at 34 live onger with fewer health issues than women who
give birth at any other age, and older women generally have more resources, and happier, more
stable and more egalitarian marriages).
30. George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United
States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277, 279, 289-90, 291-96 (1996).
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 279-82
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Americans as among whites, is virtually non-existent.36 Nonmarital
births increased more slowly for whites, but did so most dramatically
for poorer whites.37 Charles Murray‟s cries of alarm about the “coming
white underclass” documented the steep rise in the eighties for this
population, rates that have resumed their climb.38 The states with the
highest white teen birth rates vote Republican, and this may be, as
Murray documented, a symbol of class anxiety.39 By 2006, the overall
nonmarital birth rate for whites had reached 32%, well above the rate
for African-Americans in the sixties that inspired the Moynihan
Report.40 While an increasing number of well-off Americans also
choose single parenthood today, those numbers are small in comparison
with the number of poorer, unmarried women giving birth in their early
twenties.
The second factor affecting the results has been the increased
riskiness of early marriage. Studies have long indicated that marriage
before the bride turns twenty produces a dramatically greater risk of
divorce.41 The most comprehensive modern data, by the government‟s
Centers for Disease Control, showed that the greatest gains in marital
stability occurred when the women‟s age at marriage increased from the
late teens to the early twenties, while for cohabitants, stability was best
achieved when the women began the relationship in her mid-twenties.42
36. For a summary of these developments, see DONNA L. FRANKLIN, ENSURING
INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY (1997).
37. See id. at 111.
38. See Murray, supra note 4.
39. See id.
40. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2006, 57(7) NAT‟L VITAL STAT. REPS.,
Jan. 7, 2009, at 1, 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_07.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Alan Booth & John N. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability, 47
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 67, 68, 71 (1985) (summarizing literature and observing that age at
marriage is the single best predictor of divorce). See generally Barbara D. Whitehead & David
Popenoe, Essay, The Marrying Kind: Which Men Marry and Why, in THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS
2004: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 6,6 (Nat‟l Marriage Project ed., 2004),
available at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/publications/SOOU/SOOU2004.pdf. Efforts to indicate
why suggest that greater infidelity at younger ages is a significant factor. Booth & Edwards,
supra, at 71; Paul R. Amato & Stacy J. Rogers, A Longitudinal Study of Marital Problems and
Subsequent Divorce, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 612, 621 (1997). The first comprehensive study
by Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Differentials in Marital Instability: 1970, 37 AM. SOC.
REV. 754, 755 (1972), found that the biggest drops in marital instability occurred as the
woman‟s age of marriage increased from the mid-teens to the late teens (a ten-point drop), and
that marital stability continued to improve as women‟s age at marriage increased from the late
teens to the early twenties (five-point drop), and from the early to mid-twenties (three-point
drop).
42. Matthew D. Bramlett & William D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Divorce, Marriage and
Remarriage in the United States, 22 VITAL & HEALTH STATS., July 2002, at 1, 55 tbl.21,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf. In a parallel study of
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This data, which examined the likelihood of divorce for different
cohorts in 1995, found that the risk of divorce declined from a very high
rate of 59% within fifteen years for those marrying before the age of 18,
49% for those marrying at 18 or 19, for those marrying in their early
twenties, and 35% for those marrying over 25.
However, a new, more intensive study of marital happiness, using
more recent data, shows that the age factor has changed.43 Instead of
looking only at divorce, the researchers examined a series of factors,
including marital happiness, interaction, conflict and “divorce
proneness.”44 They found, as did the earlier studies, that marriage before
the age of 20 strongly correlated with increased divorce risk.45 Their
1980 data, like the earlier studies, showed a decline in divorce risk after
the age of 19, but very little gain as the marriage age increased from 2024, 25-29, and 30-34 (though it did show substantial gains in marital
quality with marriage over the age of 35).46 Their data from 2000,
however, showed a strikingly different pattern. Those who married at
age 19 or younger continued to be at a much greater risk of divorce than
those who married later.47 But the 2000 data also showed consistent
gains in marital quality with each increase in age, so that the divorce
proneness of the group dropped steadily from under the age of 19 to
over 20, from 20-24 to 25-29, from 25-29 to 30-34, and again over the
age of 35.48 The authors concluded that the “trend for young adults to
complete their education, become economically secure, find more
suitable marriage partners, and ensure that they are psychologically
ready appears to have benefitted contemporary marital relationships.”49
Together, the decline of the shot gun marriage, the increased
riskiness of younger marital unions, and the changing economy, which
has simultaneously increased the rewards for education and eliminated
cohabitation rates, however, the CDC found that the greatest improvements in stability occurred
when the woman‟s age at the start of cohabitation was in the over 25 age group, rather than the
20-24 age group. Id. at 49 tbl.15. In contrast with the marriage figures, the CDC found no
statistically significant differences between the stability of cohabitation begun in the late teens
versus the early twenties. Id. The CDC offered no explanation for these results. It is possible
that the institutional role of marriage is more critical to relationship success in the early
twenties, but the results may also be explained by differences in the populations who cohabit
earlier rather than later in life.
43. Id. at 55.
44. PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING
79 (2009).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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the jobs paying a family wage to less educated young men, have remade
the relationship between class and family. The transformation is still
underway for whites, and the rate of change varies by region. Consider,
for example, the teen birth rate. The lowest overall rates are in the
Northeast—the wealthiest part of the country and the region most
unequivocally embracing the blue paradigm.50 The highest rates are in
the South or Southwest, particularly Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi,
Arizona, and Arkansas.51 By the end of the nineties, the rate of change
had accelerated.52 In 1988, for example, the lowest teen birth rates were
in Minnesota, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hampshire and
Vermont.53 Since then, rates have dropped more dramatically in New
England than the upper Midwest, increasing the regional
concentration.54 The five states with the highest rates in 1988
(Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, Texas and Arizona), in contrast,
did not change significantly.55
These patterns partially reflect racial composition.56 The states with
low teen birth rates are much less diverse than the states with higher
teen birth rates.57 Looking at white individuals, the states with the
lowest rates were New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York
and Rhode Island—still in the Northeast, but concentrated in the
wealthy mid-Atlantic states and New England.58 In contrast, the highest
white teen birth rates were concentrated in the very conservative,
50. GUTTMACHER INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCY STATISTICS: NATIONAL AND STATE
TRENDS AND TRENDS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 2 (2006).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 11 tbl.3.3.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generally id. at 14-16 tbls.3.4-3.6. The pattern for African-Americans is a little
harder to gauge than the rate for whites. The states with the lowest African-American teen birth
rates are New Hampshire, Utah, New York, and Rhode Island, with California, Massachusetts,
and New Mexico tied for fifth. Id. at 14 tbl.3.4. New Hampshire (under 1%), New Mexico
(under 2%), and Utah (2%) have such small African-American populations as to make analysis
difficult. Id. at 16 tbl.3.6. The states with the highest rates of African-American births are not
concentrated by region, and include Wisconsin, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi and Ohio. Id. at
14 tbl.3.4, 16 tbl.3.6. Accordingly, the low overall state teen birth rates for the states in the
upper part of New England may reflect a lack of diversity, and the high rates in the Southwest
may reflect the percentage of Latinos. See id. at 14 tbl.3.4. Nonetheless, the teen births for
whites alone diverge most between the core northeastern states and the southern states. See id.
57. For example, Latinos constitute 42% of the population of New Mexico, 32.4% of
California, 32% of Texas, and 25% of Arizona. Id. at 16 tbl.3.6. Moreover, since the Latino
population in these states is substantially younger than the white population, and fertility rates
are higher, the effect on the teen birth rate is substantial. Over half of all births in these states are
to Latinos. See id. tbl.3.6.
58. Id.
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traditional, and poorer border and Southern states: Arkansas, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.59 These states also tend to show
the greatest commitment to “moral values.”60
These changing patterns of family formation, which partly reflect
differences in wealth and the racial and class composition of different
regions of the country, set up an ideological battle. The new blue
paradigm, which has been embraced politically in the same states with
the highest average ages of marriage (the Northeast and the West Coast)
is deeply offensive to those who adhere to more religious and traditional
family values. It assumes that sex will occur without marriage. It
embraces birth control and abortion. It worries more about poverty than
about the nonmarital births that tend to be associated with poverty. And
the most visible symbols of the new model—the Hollywood stars
flaunting their alternative lifestyles—may be a deep affront to those
who see their communities in danger. The more conservative areas of
the country are more culturally diverse—the distinctive cultural patterns
of the South and border states are not the same as those of the mountain
or plains states. Nonetheless, those with the greatest commitment to
traditional religious values, who would like to continue to promote the
unity of sex, marriage, and reproduction, face the greatest challenges to
continued family stability.
III. BACKLASH: BRINGING BACK BABY AS THE
PUNISHMENT FOR FORNICATION
By the end of the seventies, the U.S. Supreme Court had banished
the shot gun marriage as official state policy. In Carey v. Population
Services International,61 the case that invalidated the New York law
restricting distribution of contraceptives to minors, the state asserted
that it if unmarried teens had ready access to contraception and could
reliably prevent pregnancy, the result would “lead to increased sexual
activity among the young.”62 The Court dismissed the suggestion that it
is appropriate to deter sexual activity by “increasing the hazards
attendant on it” out of hand, observing that “no court or commentator
has taken the argument seriously.”63 The Court explained that: “It would
be plainly unreasonable to assume that the (the State) has prescribed
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as . . . punishment for
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 694.
Id. (quotation omitted).
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fornication . . . . We remain reluctant to attribute any such „scheme of
values‟ to the State.”64 With that declaration, the shot gun marriage as
official state policy was at an end—at least until the next decade
brought it back.
The red paradigm has sought to bring marriage back at the federal
and state levels as the only institution specially designed to unite sex
and procreation. Thus, the natural law tradition, which has been cited in
opposition to same-sex marriage, views the unity that comes from the
distinctive nature of heterosexual sex as central to the definition of
marriage as an intrinsic good.65 Political scientist Hadley Arkes, for
example, has remarked that “sexuality” refers to that part of our nature
that has as its end the purpose of begetting.66 In comparison, the other
forms of “sexuality” may be taken as minor burlesques or even
mockeries of the true thing.67 The Institute for American Values, which
in other respects distances itself from the Christian right, nonetheless
reasons in its statement on “Marriage and the Law” that: “The vast
majority of human children are created through acts of passion between
men and women. Connecting children to their mother and father
requires a social and legal institution called „marriage‟ with sufficient
power, weight, and social support to influence the erotic behavior of
young men and women.”68
The key to this social conservative agenda is not just marriage
promotion, which might focus on encouraging childbearing within
marriage and discouraging divorce. Indeed, such efforts, if effective and
if voluntarily undertaken, might command widespread support. Instead,
these efforts emphasize renewing the link between marriage and control
of sexuality. Doing so requires making sexuality more hazardous. This
agenda brings together religious teachings about the relationship
between sex and marriage with a political mission to enlist the state in
promoting the right values.
This new political agenda has focused most prominently on the high
profile issues of same-sex marriage and abortion. Less noted, however,
have been the efforts to undercut access to contraception.
Contraception, of course, is too popular and widely available to restrict
64. Id. at 695 (quotation omitted).
65. See, e.g., John Finnis, Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1049, 1066 (1994); Robert P. George, Jr., What’s Sex Got to Do With It? Marriage,
Morality, and Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 71 (2004).
66. Hadley Arkes, Questions of Principle, Not Predictions: A Reply to Macedo, 84 GEO.
L.J. 321, 323 (1995).
67. Id.
68. Marriage and the Law: A Statement of Principles, INST. AM. VALUES, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY TO MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 5 (2006), available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/mlawstmnt_exsumm.pdf.
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on a wholesale basis. Instead, such efforts have involved the restriction
of availability for the most vulnerable, especially teens, the poor, and
minority women dependent on government subsidized access. The
principle arenas in the fight are abstinence education, parental
involvement, restrictions on federal subsidization, and access to new
techniques such as Plan B, the morning-after pill.
Dating back to the eighties, for example, have been efforts to
undercut Title X, the federal program that attempts to discourage teen
pregnancy through systematic provision of contraceptives.69 Senator
Jesse Helms denounced the program, observing that “no one can deny
the fact that Title X does indeed subsidize teenage sexual activity. . . . at
a minimum, Title X tends to create an atmosphere in which teenage
promiscuity is viewed as normal and acceptable conduct.”70 The Reagan
administration‟s efforts to require parental involvement, which would
have effectively deterred teens from setting foot in family planning
centers, were struck down by the courts,71 but cuts in federal funding
were a factor in the steep rise in teen births in the late eighties and early
nineties.72
In more recent years, these efforts have focused not just on securing
parental involvement in teen contraceptive and abortion access, but in
fighting to turn back the clock on sexual permissiveness more generally.
In 2008, the Republican Party platform provided that:
We renew our call for replacing “family planning”
programs for teens with increased funding for abstinence
education, which teaches abstinence until marriage as the
responsible and expected standard of behavior. Abstinence
from sexual activity is the only protection that is 100
percent effective against out-of-wedlock pregnancies and
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS when
transmitted sexually.73
69. See, e.g., Jeannie I. Rosoff & Asta M. Kenney, Title X and Its Critics, 16 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 111 (1984).
70. Id. at 114-15 (reprinting Senator Jesse Helms‟ testimony before the Labor and Human
Resources Subcommittee on Family and Human Services, Apr. 5, 1984).
71. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed‟n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
72. See Stephanie J. Ventura et al., Births to Teenagers I the United States, 1940-2000,
49 NAT‟L VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 25, 2001. After falling sharply from 1960 to 1980, the decline
in teen birth leveled off at the beginning of the Reagan administration, and then increased
sharply upward from the mid-eighties until the beginning of the Clinton administration. See id.
They declined again steeply in the nineties. See id.
73. OpenEducation.net, 2008 Republican Party Platform Formally Addresses Education,
http://www.openeducation.net/2008/09/02/2008-republican-party-platform-formally-addresses-e
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Yet, as we have discussed at length elsewhere, abstinence-only
education has been ineffective in promoting abstinence until marriage
and may make it more likely that teens will not use contraception when
they do have intercourse.74 Indeed, preliminary reports suggest that the
popularity of abstinence only programs may have contributed to the
recent rise in teen pregnancy.75
In the next section of the Article, we examine the effects of such
efforts and their impact in exacerbating the relationship between class,
family and the consequences of sex.
A. Flunking Sex Ed: Education, Class, and Family in the New
American Hierarchy
When we think of the law and fertility, our minds turn to abortion;
this reflects how central abortion has become to mobilizing family
values voters. In fact, the efforts to resurrect traditional understandings
of marriage and family more comprehensively involve abstinence
education, contraception, sterilization, and infertility. In each of these
instances, we can see class at work, we can see the privileges that class
endows, and we can also see how fights over moral values are most
likely to affect those who are least likely to vote.76 Indeed, family
structure and poverty affect voter turnout, and family structure has
become a major predictor of voting patterns.77
Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that the measures taken to
reinforce the messages conservative parents would like to instill in their
children may have the largest impact on the poor and the vulnerable.
When it comes to decreases in funding for contraception and abortion,
the poor have fewer options.
1. Contraception
Although virtually all American women will use some form of
ducation/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
74. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W.
VA. L. REV. 459, 460 (2007).
75. See Kristin A. Moore, Teen Births: Examining the Recent Increase, Research Brief
(Child Trends, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.childtrends.org/
Files/Child_Trends_2009_03_13_FS_TeenBirthRate.pdf.
76. High income voters are most likely to vote, even controlling for education. See Yosef
Bonaparte, Why Do High Income Families Have Higher Voter Turnout? 13 (JEL, Working
Paper Series No. D71 & D72, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882565.
77. Nicholas H. Wolfinger & Raymond E. Wolfinger, Family Structure and Voter
Turnout, 86 SOC. FORCES 1513, 1518-19 (2008).
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contraception during their lifetimes, there remains enormous variation
in contraceptive use and non-use among sexually active men and
women. Wealthy and more educated women are more likely to
consistently use birth control: 19% of wealthier women (above 250% of
the poverty line) did not use contraceptives for some period during a
year compared to 29% of women living in poverty; and 15% of college
graduates, compared to 36% of those with less than a high school
education, did not use contraceptives during the same period.78 Women
who are uninsured are almost twice as likely as privately insured
women to go without contraceptives for a period of one year.79
Part of the problem is funding. Medicaid is the primary system that
funds health care access for poor women, in contrast with the Title X
family planning program, which provides only about 12% of all funds.80
However, Medicaid is limited to women who are pregnant or who have
children and receive public welfare through Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF).81 When Medicaid expanded eligibility to a
group of women whose Medicaid benefits were due to expire and to
some women of higher income (but still relatively low income women),
greater contraceptive use produced a 4% decline in the birth rate of
teens, and a 2% decline in the birth rate of women over the age of 19.82
2. Abortion
Let us turn next to abortion, something we think of in terms of the
culture wars, but not necessarily in terms of class. Abortion has,
however, always been a class issue. In the time before Roe v. Wade,
when abortions were illegal in most states, wealthier women were better
able to obtain abortions.83 They could travel to jurisdictions (like New
York or England) that had legalized abortion, and they could obtain
exceptions from stringent laws.84 For example, in 1972, the year before
78. Jennifer J. Frost et al., Improving Contraceptive Use in the United States, In Brief
(Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), May 9, 2008, at 3.
79. Id.
80. Facts on Publicly Funded Contraceptive Services in the United States, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Guttmacher Institute, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contraceptive_serv.html.
81. Amy Sullivan, Behind the Family-Planning Flap, TIME ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1874683,00.html.
82. Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Subsidized Contraception, Fertility, and
Sexual Behavior, 91 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 137, 137 (2009).
83. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN WOMEN‟S LIVES 14 (2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf [hereinafter BOONSTRA ET AL.,
ABORTION IN WOMEN‟S LIVES].
84. Id.
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the Court decided Roe, more than 100,000 women traveled to New
York State, where abortion was legal; 50,000 of these women traveled
farther than 500 miles.85
Today, quite ironically, poor women are more likely to get an
abortion than are wealthier women. The role of abortion in determining
the life chances of some women is, however, a critical concern for the
poor, minorities, those who have less control over their sexuality (a big
predictor of divorce as well), and those from abusive and dysfuntional
families. When New York Times reported in early 2009 that abortion
was “safe, legal, and inexpensive,” the directors of the Abortion Access
Project and the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health wrote
in to protest that “An abortion at 10 weeks‟ gestation costs $523 on
average, often out of pocket. To term this “inexpensive,” especially in
the current economy, is ludicrous.”86
For poor women, the tradeoffs between access to contraception,
abortion, and unintended births are acute. The Guttmacher Institute
reports, for example, that at the turn of the century the “unintended
pregnancy rate rose 29% among women living below the poverty level
and 26% among women living between 100% and 200% of the poverty
level, but fell 20% among more affluent women.”87 These increases
reflect access and use of contraception. Unintended pregnancy rates also
rose for high school dropouts, and women between the ages of nineteen
and twenty-four, while declining for adolescents and college
graduates.88 Unintended pregnancy rates influence the incidence of
abortion, and abortion rates are predictably higher for those with higher
unintended pregnancy rates.89 Thus, poor women, who constituted 30%
of all women of reproductive age in the United States in 2000, obtained
57% of the abortions.90 Unsurprisingly, these patterns also correlate
with race. White women, who had lower pregnancy rates, ended only
18% of conceptions with abortion.91 African Americans, who had
higher pregnancy rates, ended 43% of conceptions with abortion.92
Hispanics terminated pregnancies 25% of the time.93
Even when they are able to obtain abortions, two-thirds of poor
85. Id.
86. Letter to the Editor, The Abortion Choices of Poor Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2009, at A22(L).
87. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN WOMEN‟S LIVES, supra note 83, at 26.
88. Rachel K. Jones et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women
Obtaining Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 226 (2002).
89. Id. at 231.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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women report that they would have liked to have undergone the
procedure at an earlier stage of the pregnancy.94 As a result, access to
abortion is more critical to reproductive choice for poorer women and
women of color. Rebekah Smith emphasizes that while overall abortion
rates were declining in the nineties, the “abortion rate among poor
women increased substantially . . . . Increasingly, women obtaining
abortions were never-married, low-income, non-white or Hispanic, and
usually the parent of at least one child.”95
Medicaid provides no funding for abortion except, according to the
1977 Hyde Amendment, in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment to
the mother.96 The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld restrictions on
poor women‟s ability to obtain abortions, first deciding in 1977 that a
state need not pay for medically necessary abortions, and then
upholding the Hyde Amendment three years later.97 The consequence is
that the 40% of poor women who are covered by Medicaid do not
receive federal funding if they need an abortion. Somewhere between
one-fifth to one-third of women on Medicaid who wanted an abortion
could not afford to obtain one.98 Some of these women are, however,
luckier than others if they live in one of the seventeen states that covers
medically necessary abortions with state funds: four of those states—
Hawaii, Maryland, New York, and Washington—do so voluntarily,
while the rest are under court order to do so.99
Abortion is more likely to affect the birth rates of nonwhite women
and, because these unintended pregnancies overwhelmingly occur to
unmarried women, the nonmarital birth rate. Three economists found
that states legalizing abortion experienced a 4% decline in births
relative to other states.100 The decline among teens, women over 35, and
nonwhite women was even greater: 13%, 8%, and 12% respectively.101
Out-of-wedlock births declined by twice as much as births in
94. Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter, Public Funding of Abortion for Poor
Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL‟Y REV. 12, 14 (2007), available at http://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/1/gpr100112.html.
95. Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and
Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 177 (2006).
96. See Hyde Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586
(1978).
97. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
98. Heather Boonstra & Adam Sonfield, Rights Without Access: Revisiting Public
Funding of Abortion for Poor Women, 3 GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL‟Y, Apr. 2000, at 8,
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030208.pdf.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Phillip Levine et al., Roe v. Wade and American Fertility, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
199-200 (1999).
101. Id.
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wedlock.102
Nearly half of all pregnancies in the United States are unintended,
including 40% of those among white women, 69% among blacks, and
54% among Latinas.103 The disparities in abortion rates underscore the
differential racial and class patterns. “Poor women constituted 30% of
all women of reproductive age in the United States, yet they obtained
57% of the abortions in 2000.”104
B. Cynical Manipulation
As an example of the attack on controlling reproduction, consider
the history of the Food and Drug Administration‟s approval of Plan B.
The Food and Drug Administration‟s consideration of Plan B,
emergency contraception, provides an example of how politics at the
national level can affect access to reproductive rights. The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved Plan B, or levonorgestrel pills,
“the morning-after pill,” as a prescription drug in 1999.105 For
maximum effectiveness, the pills must be taken within seventy-two
hours of unprotected intercourse because they are designed to interfere
to prevent ovulation, and may affect the processes leading up to
implantation.106 According to the manufacturer, they will not affect an
existing pregnancy; that is, they will not affect a pregnancy after the
embryo has become implanted in the uterine wall.107 Plan B, which is
also called emergency contraception, differs from RU-486 in that the
latter can dislodge an existing pregnancy even after implantation, and
can be effective within forty-nine days after the beginning of the
woman‟s last period.
In April 2003, the company that manufactured Plan B (now Barr
Pharmaceuticals) filed an application to make the drug available without
a prescription.108 Later that year, two FDA advisory committees voted
102. Id.
103. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst.,
Washington, D.C.) July 2008, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_
abortion.pdf
104. Smith, supra note 95, at 177.
105. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
DECISION PROFESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
106. Id. at 12.
107. Plan B One-Step, When Should I Take It?, http://www.planbonestep.com/index.aspx?
page=6 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
108. Sydney Kokjohn, Note, The Imposition of an Age Restriction on Over-The-Counter
Access to Plan B Emergency Contraception: Violating Constitutional Rights to Privacy and
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(23-4) to approve the application, without any limitation on the age of
the recipient, and relevant FDA staff indicated their support.109
Nonetheless, the FDA issued a statement of non-approval, explaining
that it was concerned about the safety of Plan B for women under the
age of 16.110 Barr filed a second application in July 2004, asking that the
drug be approved without a prescription for girls and women age 16 or
older.111 Almost two years later, the FDA finally approved the over-thecounter availability of Plan B, but only for women 18 years or older.112
Minors need a prescription to obtain the drug.113 The FDA based this
restriction on a lack of adequate data concerning the safety of Plan B for
minors—even though numerous medical groups, including the
American Academy of Pediatrics, supported its availability.114
The background story is far more interesting. During the first phase
of the FDA‟s deliberations, when it was considering the initial
application, several employees of the FDA testified in depositions that
they were told that rejecting Plan B was a political necessity. 115 New
York Times reported that
John Jenkins, director of “the agency‟s office of new drugs,
said in a deposition that his boss, Dr. Steven Galson, told
him “that he felt he didn‟t have a choice” but to reject the
application . . . . “And he characterized that in a sense that
he wasn‟t sure that he would be allowed to remain as center
director if he didn‟t agree with the action,” Dr. Jenkins
said. . . . Dr. Florence Houn, director of the office that
evaluated the Plan B application, said that she was told by
Dr. Janet Woodcock, a deputy F.D.A. commissioner, that a
rejection was necessary “to appease the administration‟s
constituents, and then later this could be approved.”116
Indeed, an internal memo of the FDA expressed the concern of Janet
Woodcock, the deputy operations commissioner, that “we could not
anticipate or prevent extreme promiscuous behaviors such as the
medication taking on an „Urban Legend‟ status that would lead
Exceeding Statutory Authority, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 369, 369 (2008).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 372-73.
111. Id. at 375.
112. Id. at 369-70.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 389-90.
115. Gardiner Harris, “Morning After” Pill Is Cleared for Wider Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/24/health/24cnd-pill.html.
116. Id.
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adolescents to form sex-based cults centered around the use of Plan
B.”117
When the Government Accounting Office subsequently investigated
the FDA‟s procedures in considering the drug, it found that the FDA
had not followed its usual procedures for approval of new drugs.118
High-level management at the FDA was much more involved in the
Plan B application than in comparable applications concerning over-thecounter status.119 Moreover, the rationale for the non-approval—that
data on older adolescents could not be applied to younger adolescents
and that over-the-counter status of Plan B might have an effect “on the
propensity for younger adolescents to engage in unsafe sexual behaviors
because of their lack of cognitive maturity”—simply “did not follow
FDA‟s traditional practices.”120 Instead, the FDA had previously relied
on data for older adolescents in deciding on a drug‟s safety for younger
adolescents, and the agency had not previously “considered behavioral
implications due to differences in cognitive development.”121 Indeed, in
a subsequent lawsuit about the FDA‟s actions, a federal court found that
there was “a strong preliminary showing of „bad faith or improper
behavior‟” on the part of the FDA.122
During the second phase, while the FDA was considering the
amended application, Susan Wood, who was the Director of the Office
of Women‟s Health at the FDA, resigned in frustration.123 She told Ted
Koppel on Nightline that she quit because she “felt that science was
being overruled at [the] FDA and women‟s health was being
damaged.”124 A few months later, Dr. Frank Davidoff, a former editorin chief of the Annals of Internal Medicine, resigned as a member of an
FDA advisory committee, explaining that he could “no longer associate
myself with an organization that is capable of making such as important
decision so flagrantly on the basis of political influence.”125
Additionally, in March, 2009, a federal judge found that the FDA had
inappropriately appointed people holding anti-abortion views to an

117. L.L. Wynn & James Trussell, Images of American Sexuality in Debates over
Nonprescription Access to Emergency Contraceptive Pills, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1272, 1272 (2006) (quotation omitted).
118. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA Has a Deal for Plan B, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at
A1.
119. GAO Report, supra note 105, at 5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at i.
122. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
123. Nightline: Birth Control Battle (ABC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005).
124. Id.
125. Tummino, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
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expert panel convened to review the drug.126
So what was behind all of this political maneuvering? Plan B is
controversial for two reasons. First, some maintain that Plan B causes
abortions. The drug, which contains a large dose of the same hormones
used in the birth control pill, is primarily designed to prevent ovulation,
and animal studies indicate that it does not block implantation of a
fertilized egg.127 Nonetheless, the manufacturer cannot rule out the
possibility that it will make it less likely that a fertilized egg will
implant in the uterine wall. Those who believe that life begins at
conception therefore maintain that any drug that lessens the likelihood
of implantation is abortion-inducing and, one complainant alleged that
Plan B caused an abortion.128 Linking Plan B to abortion, given the
intensity of views on the issue, guarantees substantial opposition.
Nonetheless, were the only issue presented by Plan B the possibility of
interfering with implantation, we suspect the drug would not have been
so controversial. The second objection, however, was that the greater
availability of something that could be taken the “morning after”
intercourse would encourage improvident behavior.129 As one witness
testified at hearings held in December 2003 on the drug, “It is selfevident that over-the-counter availability of the morning after pill will lead
to increased promiscuity and its attendant physical and psychological
damage.”130 The Concerned Women for America alleged that it would
result in an “increase in the already too high STD [sexually transmitted
diseases] rates by encouraging risky sexual activity, and be given by
statutory rapists to adolescents to cover up the continuing abuse.”131 The
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops alleged that improved access to
126. Natasha Singer, Contraception Pill Strictures are Eased by a Judge, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2009, at A12.
127. Emergency Contraception’s Mode of Action Clarified, POP. BRIEFS (Pop. Council,
New York, N.Y.) May 2005, at 1, 3, available at http://www.popcouncil.org/mediacenter/news
releases/ecdisruptsovulation.html.
128. For a discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Claire Smearman, Drawing The Line: The
Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 469, 481 (2006); U.S. Food and Drug Admin. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research:
Hearing Before Non-Prescription Drugs Advisory Comm. and Advisory Comm. for
Reproductive Health Drugs (Dec. 16, 2003), at 191 [hereinafter FDA, Joint Meeting] (statement
of Dr. Chris Kahlenborn).
129. Harris, supra note 115.
130. FDA, Joint Meeting, supra note 128, at 181 (statement of James Carroll); see id. at
193 (statement of Dr. Daniel Hussar) (“I think the availability of Plan B without restrictions would
increase or would reduce safe sex precautions which could lead to the increase in consequences,
such as STDs.”).
131. Letter from Wendy Wright, Senior Policy Director of Concerned Women for
America, on reproductive drugs to FDA Advisory Comm. (Dec. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.cwfa.org/images/content/ww-maptest.pdf.
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contraception does not decrease the number of unwanted pregnancies.132
It was concerned that mandating insurance coverage of contraceptives
for minors would subvert parental rights over their children.133
Those advocating for the wider availability of Plan B argued that
emergency contraception could provide significant help in reducing the
number of unplanned teen pregnancies and abortions.134 In their
testimony supporting the availability of Plan B, the National Partnership
for Women and Families pointed out that about one-half of the
unplanned pregnancies in the United States each year resulted from
contraceptive failure, and that women could be trusted to use Plan B
responsibly.135 While existing testing has not yet established whether
widespread use of Plan B will reduce the pregnancy rate, the initial
testing suggests that it does not affect the rate of unprotected sex, and
ease of access makes women more likely to use it.136
FDA regulations, of course, determine the availability of emergency
contraception for the entire country. In addition, different states
determine how it will be distributed. More than half of all states require
that if private insurance policies cover prescription drugs, then they
must also cover all FDA-approved contraceptives, including emergency
contraception. Most other states provide for general coverage except for
certain insurance plans and employers; indeed, only two states (North
Carolina and Arkansas) explicitly exclude emergency contraceptives
from this mandate.137 Nonetheless, in other states, Plan B may be
excluded from Medicaid coverage. By contrast, in 15 states, emergency
rooms are required to provide information about emergency
contraceptives, and, in more than 2/3 of these states, emergency rooms

132. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pro-Life Activities—Fact Sheet: Greater
Access to Contraception Does Not Reduce Abortions, http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/
contraception/contrafactsheet0207.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
133. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pro-Life Activities—Fact Sheet: Contraceptive
Mandates, at http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/abortion/contfac2.shtml (last visited Oct. 28,
2009).
134. E.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Statement on the FDA’s
Approval of OTC Status for Plan B®, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.acog.org/from_home/
publications/press_releases/nr08-24-06.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
135. Nat‟l P‟ship for Women & Families, Testimony in Support of Over-the-Counter
(OTC) Status for Plan B® (2003), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/Doc
Server/portals_p3_library_ReproHealthMedicalTech_PlanBTestimony.pdf?docID=583.
136. Tina R. Raine et al., Direct Access to Emergency Contraception Through Pharmacies
and Effect on Unintended Pregnancy and STIs: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 293 JAMA 54,
54-61 (2005).
137. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
CONTRACEPTIVES (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.
pdf.
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can dispense Plan B upon the request of a sexual assault victim.138 The
arguments that Plan B will affect sexual behavior, though not
implausible, are not fundamentally different from those about
contraception more generally. It is certainly true that the widespread
availability of reliable forms of contraception such as the pill have had
an impact on sexual practices, and particularly on the acceptability of
nonmarital intercourse. Nonetheless, with the change in mores
established without the availability of Plan B, the greater availability of
emergency contraception is unlikely to have much impact on overall
sexual behavior. Its primary effect is likely to be in preventing
pregnancy in cases of contraceptive failure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Policies that protect the availability of contraceptive choice are
critical as we move forward;139 the highest rates of unwanted
pregnancies and abortions and lowest rates of contraceptive use are
correlated with income. We must rebuild the emphasis on contraception,
and move away from a focus on abortion as we consider how, in
Professor Weyrauch‟s words, we can pay attention to the “implications
of social class . . . on how to regulate the consequences of sexual
conduct.”140
The following three issues will be critical to rethinking contraceptive
policies for the nation as a whole:
1. Comprehensive sex education. Comprehensive sex education
includes arguments for abstinence alongside of medically accurate
information about contraception. Abstinence-only efforts: a) have been
less effective in reducing pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases
than comprehensive efforts; and, b) increase regional, class, and racial
inequalities as the poorest Americans, who are the most likely to lack
access to other sources of information, are also the most likely to be
enrolled in abstinence only programs, whatever their preferences may
be. We emphasize that the issue is not whether the values underlying
abstinence should be taught; it is whether they should be taught to the
exclusion of other views.
2. Comprehensive access to contraception. For adults, contraceptive
138. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION (2009),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_EC.pdf.
139. For a comprehensive analysis of state-by-state efforts, see Contraception Counts:
Ranking State Efforts IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., Washington, D.C. 2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/02/28/IB2006n1.pdf.
140. Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 836.
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access is largely a matter of funding and convenience—and choice. The
most reliable methods are long acting ones such as sterilization, IUDs,
and hormonal implants. These methods, unlike lower tech devices such
as condoms, can be expensive and require access to a doctor and the
ability to fill prescriptions. Accordingly, the reliability of contraceptive
use corresponds to access to health care.141
3. Adolescent access. The much more divisive issue with respect to
contraception is teen access, particularly without parental consent.
Although the Supreme Court decision guaranteeing contraceptive access
to teens remains good law, a number of states have taken measures that
undercut ready access (e.g., requirements that they must be married, or
that a physician must certify the necessity).
The issue of adolescent access is a critical one because teen
pregnancy has more negative consequences on mothers and children,
and because parental consent requirements overwhelmingly result in
less teen contraceptive use. On the other hand, the issue of parental
authority touches a responsive chord in many parts of the population.
Like other family planning issues, this is controversial, with numerous
interests to balance; overall, it seems critical to ensure that all teens,
regardless of income, have what they need to prevent unwanted
childbirth.
Reproductive autonomy is most readily available for the affluent and
the sophisticated, and is increasingly beyond the reach of the most
vulnerable. Family planning efforts of all kinds have been the biggest
casualty of the cynical manipulation of ideological politics, and are a
critical arena for national policy.
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